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FORCE AND THE CHARTER IN THE 
SEVENTIES* 
Julius Stone 
Force and the Charter is a very complex problem. It imports not 
merely the place of force in the relations of States within the Charter of 
the United Nations, but also the residual rules of international law, 
which themselves are very much older-several centuries older at 
least-than the United Nations. These are the residual rules of interna-
tional law, customary international law, as we call it, concerning the use 
of force, insofar as the Charter has not abrogated those rules. 1 
I 
The general view often put forward by some of my colleagues is 
that after the United Nations Charter came into effect all use of force 
between States became unlawful, except in two situations. The first 
situation involves a Member State of the United Nations as the victim 
of an armed attack by another State. 2 This depends on Article 51 of the 
Charter. The other situation is that in which collective force is used by 
States under the United Nations Charter. This authority is granted to 
the Security Council under Chapter 7 of the Charter3 (the so-called 
Peace Enforcement Chapter). It has also been argued that similar au-
thority lies in the General Assembly. 
That then, is one level of consideration, the level of vulgar 
understanding, of the position after 1945. Whether or not you take that 
position (but the more startling if you do take that position) you have 
to proceed to the level of historical experience. On this second level, 
when you look over the history of the use of force in the relations of 
States since 1945 there have been more than one hundred overt exer-
cises of force by one or more States against other States since the 
Charter came into force. You would never guess in how many of those 
cases the provisions of the Charter against the unlawful use of force by 
States had been invoked, let alone effectively invoked. About the only 
case, and this is arguable on technical grounds that we cannot go into 
* The following article originated as a speech, delivered by Professor Stone on Sep-
tem her 27, 197:l, at the Syracuse University College of Law. It is reproduced here in full. 
A fuller account of this analysis is contained in J. STONE, OF LAW AND NATIONS, POWER 
POLITICS ANO HUMAN HOPES (1954). 
1. See R. SwtIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CURRENT ANO CLASSIC 478 (1969). 
2. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. 
:i. U.N. CHARTER arts. 41, 42, 45, 48 & 49. 
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tonight, is the case of Korea. So, you have the stark contrast between 
the vulgar understanding that a new era, in which all threat or use of 
force between States is virtually outlawed as an instrument of policy, 
on the one hand, and on the other, the actualities that the threat or use 
of force continues to be a main instrument of policy between States. 
Of course, you can go into all sorts of elaborate explanations from 
political, social, psychological, diplomatic and technological points of 
view as to why this is. If you take the vulgar point of view, that the 
Charter does outlaw the use of force, except for those two rather very 
narrow situations, 4 you can speculate about all sorts of reasons why the 
Charter has, as it were in this respect, failed. You will then ask, in the 
words of my colleague at Columbia, Tom Franck, in his nicely (but very 
misleadingly) titled article, "Who Killed Article 2(4)?"5 
If there is any article that is the key article in the matters that I 
am going to discuss tonight it is Article 2(4), because it reads: 
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations. 6 
Tom Franck, proceeding (I suspect) from what I have called the vulgar 
view that force, except in those two narrow situations mentioned above, 
is outlawed under the Charter, and facing the undoubted and continued 
proliferation of the use of force after the Charter, concludes that some-
body, as it were, must have knifed Article 2(4) in the back. 
Now, of course, circumstances may be put forward as explaining 
why Article 2(4) failed, without actually assuming that somebody knifed 
Article 2(4) in the back. You are familiar, no doubt, with a number of 
these. For example, more than half of the members of the United Na-
tions at the present time (including all the Soviet bloc States, all the 
Communist States, if I may so characterize them, as well as practically 
all the African and Asian States) have espoused the doctrine and built 
it into the rhetoric, if not fully into the practice, of the United Nations, 
that certain kinds of use of force are not use of.force at all. They are 
"wars of liberation."7 To put it another way, they have espoused the 
doctrine that war is a permissible use of force, not only under general 
international law but under the Charter, when it is directed to what 
4. See notes 2 & 3 supra and accompanying text. 
5. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970) . 
6. U.N . CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. 
7. Se<' Emerson, The New Hi!{her Law of Anti-Colonialism, in THE RELEVANCE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAw 159 (K.W. Deutsch & S. Hoffmann eds. 1968). This essay discusses 
the concept of the war of liberation as a just war and as such places it outside the 
principles of peaceful co-existence, thereby allowing it to supersede sweeping condemna-
tions of war . 
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these States regard as a vindication of the principle of self-
determination. This proceeds on the very nice theory that any State that 
is in the position of sovereign over a non-metropolitan territory (such as, 
to take an extreme case, Portugal's dominion over its colonies in Africa) 
is to be deemed (as we lawyers would say, is constructively by a fiction 
deemed to be) in a constant state of aggression against the people of that 
territory, preventing them from enjoying their self-determination. It is 
therefore open to any other State, as well as to the oppressed "People," 
to use force against Portugal for repelling this continuing aggression. 
Although we may have a great moral empathy with this point of 
view, it is obvious that in a world in which claims of territory, even after 
decolonization, are still fairly widespread, (and we have the lndo-
Pakistan affair in recent years, and a little further back from that we 
had the Indian relation to the Portuguese enclaves in India, and there 
are half a dozen other recent examples) the indulgence by a majority of 
members of the United Nations in the fiction that, when you use force 
against a State on the ground that that State is frustrating the desire 
for independence of some people, this is not force, is obviously some-
thing that bites deep into vulgar notions that threat or use of force is 
unlawful. 
Again, of course, and even more important than that, one can really 
perhaps think that later developments, as distinct from later political 
attitudes, have somehow undermined the supposed prohibition on the 
use of force under Article 2( 4). This produces a fact so plain that even 
most sky-blue idealists are ready to acknowledge it, although they tend 
to put it behind them when there is any close debate about the meaning 
of the text. That fact is, that a State threatened by nuclear attack will 
not regard itself as barred by Article 2( 4) from using threats or force 
against another nuclear power from whom a nuclear attack is impend-
ing. The idea that Article 2( 4) forbids any forceful action by such a 
threatened State until the nuclear attack is actually sustained is so 
preposterous that nobody has ever seriously suggested that a prospective 
victim is legally obligated to accept it. This factor, the nature of nuclear 
weapons, fully emerged only after the drafting of the Charter, so that 
one can say that it overtook the Charter, and was a factor contributing 
to the "death" of Article 2(4). 
I would doubt, however, whether it is the main factor. The main 
factors are rather limits on the prohibition of threat or use of force built 
into the Charter itself, by way of escapes from the assumed prohibition 
of force. One limit, of course, is the whole structural arrangement within 
the United Nations Charter itself. The powers of the Security Council, 
especially under Chapter 7 on peace enforcement (which you remember 
is predicated in Article 39 on the occurrence of any threat to the peace, 
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breach of the peace or act of aggression) 8 are on their face utterly plen-
ary, probably more plenary even than those of the President of the 
United States and the Congress, after the present rivalries between 
these two authorities as to the war and peace power have been settled. 
These plenary powers of the Security Council over any situation in 
which there is a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression, nevertheless, have a "teeny-weeny" limit built into them. 
By a "teeny-weeny" limit I refer to the kind of defect disclosed by an 
old-fashioned marriage broker in a modern society where such brokers 
still operate. 
The father of the prospective bridegroom would listen very pa-
tiently as the marriage broker listed all the beauties, virtues and talents 
of the charming bride-to-be. The matchmaker would go on for quite a 
long time and with conventional politeness the father, at the end, would 
say how humble he, as head of his family, felt in the face of such a 
lineage, one of such beauties, talents and graces. He would then say that 
he had listened with the greatest interest to the list of these and was 
there anything else, perhaps even by way of qualification, that the 
matchmaker might like to mention? The matchmaker would demur 
vigorously, but the father would press the request several times. Finally, 
but even then still reluctantly, the matchmaker would say that there 
was just one "teeny-weeny" thing, of no great importance. One "teeny-
weeny" thing; the father would snatch eagerly at the point: Well what 
is that? Finally, the matchmaker would say "the bride is a teeny-weeny 
little bit pregnant!" 
Chapter 7 of the Charter is, in a similar sense, a "teeny-weeny" bit 
pregnant. Unlike many pregnancies, this was one that was deliberately 
produced by the draftsmen of the Charter. This is exemplified by the 
operative powers of the Security Council, especially its operative powers 
under Chapter 7, which are conditioned on the non-exercise by any of 
the five permanent members (the so-called Great Powers) of the power 
to veto. 9 So it was that many of the hundred cases where force has been 
used since 1945 without even a show of challenging its illegality, could 
occur because a veto was certain to be cast, either because one or an-
other Great Power was involved, or the State which was involved was, 
as it were, under the patronage or protection of a satellite of such a veto-
bearing Great Power. The Soviet Union has well over a hundred vetoes 
to its credit; France and Great Britain many fewer. The United States 
never vetoed until recent years, for the very good reason that you only 
need an umbrella when it rains, and until recently the United States 
could usually marshall enough protective votes without it. It has been 
8. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. 
9. U.N . CHARTER art. 27, para. 3. 
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with the great influx of new members, most of whom have tended to line 
up on many issues with the Soviet bloc, that the United States has 
found the use of the veto inescapable. 
I am saying that the fact that there is this "teeny-weeny" built-in 
limitation on the plenary powers of the Security Council is a reason why 
the vulgar account of the stringent outlawing of force by the Charter has 
proved to be so illusory. There are other such escape factors built into 
the Charter, which I will not try to exhaust, 10 under which war-like 
alliances like NATO and the Warsaw Pact have become powerful reali-
ties outside of but consistent with the Charter. These are alliances which 
in theory the talks on Mutual Reduction of Armaments in Europe may 
conceivably cut down, or even disband. But personally, I doubt whether 
these factors in the failure of the vulgar view to explain the realities will 
soon disappear. The effect of the dominating role of these alliances has 
been that in some situations, in which conceivably the legal prohibitions 
of force in the Charter might have been expected to operate (for in-
stance, the crises over West Berlin), struggles were relegated to the play 
of politics beyond the United Nations. 
II 
What I am putting, and what brings me to the third level of consid-
eration is this: What is implied in the title of Professor Franck's article 11 
is that Article 2(4) of the Charter, if properly interpreted by lawyer-like 
lawyers, would have rendered unlawful all or very many of the hundred 
or so resorts to force since 1945, but for the fact that someone or other 
prevented Article 2(4) from operating. Who was this? Who killed Article 
2(4)? 
On the third level of consideration that I am now approaching, the 
question is whether the implication is correctly drawn. The question is 
whether, looking at the Charter, careful lawyers could read it as prohib-
iting the use of force to the sweeping extent that the vulgar view sug-
gests. I must now therefore, spend a little time on this question of 
interpretation of the Charter. 
I have said that the central, but not only, provision of the Charter 
10 . S ee J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 243-85 (rev. ed. 1959), 
for a detailed discussion of clauses of escape under the provisions of the U.N. Charter. 
Particular reference is made to the following: (a) The "Inherent Right" of individual or 
collective self-defense against armed attack reserved under Article 51; (b) The liberty of 
act ion of mem hers of the United Nations against former enemy States under Article 53, 
para. 1 and Article 107; (c) The liberty of members to enter into regional arrangements 
under Articles 52-54; (d) The exclusion from United Nations jurisdiction of matters essen-
tially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State expressly under Article 2, para . 7 and 
hy implication under various articles of Chapters VI and VII. 
11. See Franck, supra note 5. 
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on which this vulgar view of the scope of the outlawing of force under 
the Charter, is Article 2(4). It will perhaps bear quotation again at this 
point: 
All members shall refrain in their international relatioris from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations. 12 
The vulgar view13 has the effect of reading this paragraph as if it ended 
with a full stop after the word "force." It would then read: "All members 
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force." Full stop. But, of course, it needs saying ad nauseum, the para-
graph does not end there, and there is no full stop. There is not, indeed, 
even a comma after the word "force." That means that you have to read 
the paragraph as it is, not as prohibiting force simpliciter, but only force 
"against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations." To avoid error you have to learn to say (and think) all of that 
in one breath, as it were. 
By this I do not mean that the full text does not, even after that, 
require analysis. When I originally offered my main dissenting opinion, 
back in the early fifties, 14 my friend, Louis Sohn, came back very vigor-
ously and full of life, and said: "What you say about Article 2(4) may 
be right, but even then you still have to reckon with the words-'any 
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.'" 
This (he said) refers us back to Article 1 of the Charter which opens 
"The Purposes of the United Nations are .... " 15 If you read Article 1 
carefully, you will see that Article 1(1) includes among these purposes 
to "maintain international peace and security, and to that end:"16 and 
then a series of things. This series of things includes: 
to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of 
threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or 
other breaches of the peace and to bring about by peaceful means and 
in conformity . . . . 17 
That is where he would stop in Article 1; and on this basis he and others 
would argue that the effect is to cancel out the qualifications on the 
12. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para . 4. 
rn. See notes 2 & 3 supra and accompanying text. 
14. 8<'<' J. STONE, QUEST FOR SURVIVAL: THE ROLE OF LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 40-56 
(1961) . In particular reference to the author's view as to Article 2, para. 4 of the U .N. 
Charter prohibiting the use of all force and his criticism of that view as being a dubious 
and oversimplistic interpretation, see id. at 45-51. 
If>. U.N. CHARTER art. 1. 
16. Id., para. I. 
17. Id. 
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prohibition on the threat or use of force in Article 2( 4) which I have 
stressed. Since Article 1 (1) talks about collective measures for the pre-
vention and removal of threats to the peace, it must be authorizing 
collective measures of force for the suppression of individual measures. 
Let me interpose here that on one point there is no conflict of views; 
namely that where collective force is used in accordance with the 
Charter, whether Article 1(1) or Chapter 7, such force is obviously lawful 
under the Charter. No disagreement with that. This probably may also 
have to be said about collective force authorized by the General Assem-
bly, as well as the Security Council, though there are certainly impor-
tant differences between these two. What is controversial is not the 
positive legitimation of collective force, but the wholesale prohibition of 
individual force by the supposed implied cancellation, by Article 1(1), 
of the qualifications of the prohibition of force in Article 2(4). How do 
you infer from the fact that the purposes of the United Nations include 
the taking of effective collective measures against individual acts of 
force, that all acts of force, except in response to armed attack, are 
forbidden by the Charter? Professor Sohn's argument does infer this 
from Article 1(1), so far as I follow it, by way of negative inference. Since 
Article 1(1) does not qualify what threats to the peace can be suppressed 
by collective measures, therefore (he seems to be saying) all threats 
to the peace, and not merely the threats or uses of force "against the 
political independence and territorial integrity of members, ... " pro-
hibited by Article 2(4), become somehow forbidden under Article 1(1). 
My main answer, however, to this kind of close analysis is that even 
here, too, the vulgar view of Article 1(1) does not read it in context. If 
you read just a little further on in the same paragraph of Article 1, and 
recall that Article 1(1) is only relevant to Article 2(4) because Article 
2( 4) forbids the threat or use of force inter alia "against the territorial 
integrity ... or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of 
the United Nations," the main issue emerges. This main issue is 
whether a particular use of force (not collective, and not in response to 
armed attack) must necessarily be inconsistent with the purposes of the 
United Nations. That is what is involved in the interpretation of Article 
2( 4), in which Article 1(1) is incorporated by reference. 
When you read a little further in Article 1(1) you find that the 
purposes of the United Nations are not only to take effective collective 
measures, etc., but also to "bring about ... in conformity with the 
principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of 
international disputes or situations which might lead to breach of the 
peace."18 
A number of scholars have asked, not particularly in relation to this 
18. Id. 
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controversy, what you are to do when it is impossible to perform all the 
things that Article 1(1) requires to be done. What, for example, if a 
wrongdoer is so outrageous and so intransigeant, that you cannot bring 
about settlement of the dispute in accordance with justice and interna-
tional law, except by resort to threat or use of force? I suppose that the 
Sohn type of view19 might say that you have to presume everything for 
the best and that since we must exclude the use of force, we have to read 
Article 1(1) as incorporated in Article 2(4) to mean that a State must 
settle its grievance with the wrongdoer by peaceful means or simply 
reconcile itself to suffering the wrong. 
When a dispute thus arises from some grave wrong, as with India's 
1971 dispute (for example) in relation to Pakistan in respect of the 
driving into her territory of 10 million persons, raising grave danger of 
cholera and other dangers of natural health, as well as the impossible 
economic burdens of sustaining them, then this kind of Sohn view would 
say that it is just too bad for India. If Pakistan would not take remedial 
measures after peaceful demands from India, well, India would just have 
to put up with the situation. 
Of course, the position that India took was not that, and the ques-
tion that I am raising is whether the position that India took is one that 
is excluded by the Charter. I am saying, coming back to Article 2(4) in 
relation to Article 1(1), which it incorporates, that it is neither prudent 
nor lawyer-like to exclude the problem which arises when the things 
which the Charter tells you must all be done, simply cannot all be done. 
There is here no way offulfilling all the Charter's purposes. The Charter, 
at such a point, can not dictate what you are to do. 
What I have called tonight the vulgar view, I have elsewhere called 
the idealist-restrictionist view. It is idealist insofar as it partakes of the 
kind of moralist idealism that Professor Barkun has well delineated 
recently. 20 It is restrictionist insofar as it is attempting to cut down to 
the minimum the legal liberty of states to go to war. The choice made 
by the idealist-restrictionist pays little attention to the context of Arti-
cle 2(4) within Article 2 itself. Thus, the third paragraph of Article 2, 
immediately preceding Article 2(4), provides very simply that: 
All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means 
in such a manner that international peace and security and justice, are 
not endangered. 21 
Now, on its face this looks like an absolute precept, more so by far than 
Article 2(4). It could be read to mean that any kind of settlement involv-
19. See p. 6 supra. 
20 . .Se<' M. Barkun, International Norms as Fact and Ideals [1972 Proceedings of the 
ASILI 66 AGIL :39-46 (Sept. 1972). 
21. ll.N. CHARTF.R art. 2, para. 3. 
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ing other than peaceful means is excluded. Thus Article 2(3) could then 
be said to prohibit flatly and absolutely any individual resort whatever 
to threat or use of force by States. But if that were the correct meaning, 
then what could Article 2(4), immediately following, mean? If you have 
a complete prohibition in Article 2(3), why is it necessary to go on in 
the next paragraph to repeat the prohibition? Furthermore, what sense 
does it make to have an absolute unlimited prohibition in Article 2(3), 
and then a very much qualified prohibition in Article 2(4)? 
There are, of course, many other elements in the interpretation 
problems that we could play about with; but I think that this is enough 
to give you a sense of its drama and complexity, and to warn you against 
anybody who says he has the only correct answer, and that it is fairly 
simple and straightforward. 
III 
My purpose tonight has not been to convert you from the vulgar 
idealist-restrictionist interpretation to my own, so-called realist-
traditionalist one. It is rather to point out to you that what these provi-
sions mean in relation to what range of force is prohibited is not at all 
simple and straightforward. There are at least these two possible broad 
interpretations. I have already spent much time on the idealist-
restrictionist view. What I am now calling the opposed realist-
traditionalist view is implicit in the criticism that I have made of the 
idealist-restrictionists. This is that you have to finally dismiss as impos-
sible the interpretation of Article 2(3) which would in absolute terms 
ban all use of force by individual states save by way of self-defense under 
Article 51. Also, when you come to Article 2(4), you have to give mean-
ing, because the draftsmen and the codifiers put it in, to the word 
"against" and to all the words that follow the word "against." You 
cannot simply ignore these words, for they are all adjectival to "threat 
or use of force" which is prohibited. It is only the kind of force so 
described that is prohibited. 
Take the little word "against," for example, in relation to the 
Middle-East problem. One of the arguments against Israel's continued 
administration of the territory she occupied after her successful self-
defense in 1967 is that on the face of it (Arab spokesmen say) she is 
occupying territory which was formerly held by Jordan on the west 
bank of the River Jordan, and that this violates Article 2(4), because 
clearly she entered by force. Her control is the fruit of force, and the 
maxim ex injuria non oriturius deprives her of any rights. Israeli spokes-
men say, in reply, that while her entry was by force, it was not by force 
violating Article 2( 4). It was not force against the territorial integrity of 
Jordan or any other State. It was force against an impending attack on 
Israel by armies of 180,000 men, highly equipped with armor and air-
9
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craft surrounding Israel's narrow territory. It was force against immedi-
ate threat of invasion and destruction of Israel. 
The word "against" there, as you see, is crucial. It is being strictly 
attended to and given the meaning of threat or use of force intended and 
resorted to in order to overrun or acquire territory. With this meaning 
of the word "against," Article 2(4) would not say anything about terri-
tory which a State comes to control in the course of defending itself 
against invasion of its own territory. Moreover, under ordinary, sensible 
meanings of self-defense, a State would seem to be entitled to continue 
self-defense until it has forced the invader back to a line at which he 
can be held against any renewal of the invasion. You see how interesting 
and tantalizing even that single word "against" can be, even without 
going into other questions about the meaning of "political independ-
ence" and "territorial integrity" and "Purposes of the United Nations." 
For a threat or use of force by States to be unlawful because forbidden 
by the Charter, you have to show that it is forbidden by the Charter. 
Where it is not so forbidden, any liberty of action available under tradi-
tional international law continues to prevail. 
If we think of the position of war under international law before 
1914, the range of State liberty to resort to it was well-nigh unlimited, 
giving States endless room to maneuver. Apart from one narrow doc-
trine, the Drago doctrine22 concerning contract debts, it was a matter 
within the discretion of each State whether it conducted its relatitms 
with other states on the basis of the law of peace or on the basis of the 
law of war. In the wave of Woodrow Wilson and Lord Cecil's drive for 
the League of Nations, the League Covenant23 was widely hailed as 
outlawing war. But when the Covenant was examined, whether by law-
yers, political scientists, or practising diplomats, it became obvious that 
it did not outlaw war, but merely established certain procedural princi-
ples and certain time limits which a State had to respect before it 
resorted to war. What the Covenant did was mark out a small restricted 
22. Dr. Drago, Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, in an instruction of December 
9, 1902, to the Argentine Minister in Washington, speaking "with reference to 
the forcible collection of the public debt suggested by the events that have taken place" 
between Venezuela and Great Britain and Germany, enunciated and advocated the adop-
tion of what has become known as the "Drago Doctrine," which he expressed in the 
following words: 
ITlhe public debt can not occasion armed intervention nor even the actual 
occupation of the territory of American nations by a European power. 
W. BISHOP, .JR., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 671 (2d ed. 1962). See also 
Drago, State Loans in Their Relation to International Policy, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 695 (1907) . 
2:J. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, arts. 1-26 and annexes. This entered into force Jan. 
10, 1920, and is reproduced, with amendments in force as of June 26, 1945, in L. GOODRICH, 
E. HAMRRO & A. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 
6n:~ (:Jd rev. ed. 1969). 
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segment of prohibition, which remained surrounded by the residual 
areas of State freedom of action. There were, between the 1914 and 1939 
wars, various attempts to "close the gaps" in the Covenant, as the 
phrase went. That is to say, to cover this whole residual area in which 
it was still lawful to go to war with a blanket prohibition. The Kellogg-
Briand pact of 192824 was the best-known example, ostensibly outlawing 
war "as an instrument of national policy." But the Signatories to it, 
including the United States, finally reserved to themselves not only the 
right of self-defense, but in terms much broader than the self-defense 
against armed attack of the Charter. Each Signatory also reserved to 
itself the determination of whether its self-defense was involved in any 
particular case. It was these reservations which led the learned Indian 
Judge Lal, on the Tokyo International Military Tribunal, to deliver a 
500 page dissenting judgment. He argued that the majority judges' as-
sumption that the Kellogg-Briand Pact imposed a wide legal prohibition 
on the resort to war was unwarranted. As a matter of law, he said, the 
prohibition did not amount to a binding obligation for the reason that 
an obligation as to which the obligee is free to determine whether it 
arises or not, is not a binding legal obligation. 
This is where we were at the end of World War II in relation to this 
particular matter. Then, of course, we took the great step at San Fran-
cisco of further delimiting the liberty to resort to force by States. (The 
change from the concept of "war" to that of "force" is not part of our 
business tonight.) The new provisions of the Charter were those we have 
been analyzing, as well as Chapter 7 which deals with the powers of the 
Security Council in case there is a threat to the peace or a breach of the 
peace or act of aggression. The effect of these further limitations is to 
mark out a further segment of the traditional area of freedom of action, 
in which restrictions are imposed. The debate between the idealist-
restrictionist and my own idealist-traditionalist position, in these terms, 
is as follows. In the idealist-restrictionist view you still have the self-
defense exception, and you still have the collective force exception. But 
so far as individual State use of force is concerned there is said to be 
now a blanket prohibition with only a narrow self-defense-against-
armed-attack exception. But in my own realist-traditionalist analysis, 
it is not only this narrow self-defense which remains licit, but any force 
which does not violate the prohibition in Article 2(4), bearing in mind 
that that paragraph does not have a full stop after the word "force," and 
thus bars only that force which is directed against the territorial integ-
24. Kellogg-Briand Pact for the Renunciation of War of 1928, Aug. 7, 1928, 46 Stat. 
W4a, ( 1929), T.S. 796 (effective July 24, 1929). Treaty between the United States and 
other world powers providing for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national 
policy. 
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rity or political independence etc. So that whatever the new area of 
prohibition is, it certainly does not cover the whole of the area of State 
freedom of action under traditional international law. 
That area of the traditional freedom not covered by this or any 
other restriction is what I now call the residual area of discretion of 
States to use force. The survival of such an area seems to me clear, not 
only from the difficulties I have exposed in interpreting the Charter so 
as to support the idealist-restrictionist view, but is also supported by 
evidence from the drafting documents, the travaux preparatoires of the 
San Francisco Conference, 25 where for instance, the French and other 
delegations used, not the narrow term "defense against armed attack" 
now embodied in Article 51 of the Charter, but phrases like "legitimate 
self-defense." Only those ignorant of legal and diplomatic history could 
fail to know that "legitimate self-defense" gives a far wider license than 
the notion of "self-defense against armed attack," permitting defense of 
rights of a certain gravity, as well as sheer physical survival. It covered, 
for example, matters like sending in forces to protect the lives of nation-
als who were unlawfully threatened, of which the rescue operation in the 
Congo was a modern case. What I am saying, is that, in addition to the 
express overriding license of Article 51 for self-defense against armed 
attack, there survive areas of licensed use of force not caught by any 
blanket prohibition of threats or use of force. In these areas use of force 
remains licit simply because there is no international instrument that 
forbids it. 
The fact that Article 51 of the Charter makes an express reservation 
for self-defense is not inconsistent with this. Article 51 opens: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of indi-
vidual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs . ... 26 
Idealist .. re~trictionists would argue that if the Charter left some wider 
license for legitimate self-defense licit, it would not have been necessary 
to insert the narrower license of Article 51. This argument is not as 
strong as it seems. There is a very good reason for this apparent overlap-
ping. The residual area of liberty under customary international law, 
surviving because it is not prohibited by the Charter, is one reason. This 
area would be cancelled out at any point where the Charter is authorita-
tively interpreted or amended so as to cover a part of it. In other words 
this area of license is quite literally subject to the provisions of the 
Charter, including Article 2(4). On the other hand, the license for self-
defense against armed attack under Article 51 is not subject to, but on 
2fi. The United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO) met at 
San Francisco, April 25 to June 26, 1945. For further information concerning participants 
and organization, see LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, arts. 4-8. 
26 . U.N. CHARTER art . 51. 
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the contrary, overrides by express words any other provision in the 
Charter. "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right 
of self-defense against armed attack .... " This overriding preemin-
ence of the liberty of self-defense against armed attack was probably as 
basic a political condition of acceptance of the Charter by the Soviet 
Union and the United States, as was the Great Power veto. Article 51 
was designed to quiet any refined anxieties, such as in the United States 
Senate, about what implications for the scope of each Member's physi-
cal self-defense may be drawn from this or that provision of the Charter. 
For by the express words of Article 51 no other provision in the Charter 
can negate the legal position that if there is armed attack, then the self-
defense right operates. 
IV 
The kind of skeptical view that I have put to you in necessarily 
abbreviated form has, I think, become very controversial in the litera-
ture since I first offered it in 1954. One of my ablest colleagues, Professor 
Robert Tucker of Johns Hopkins, has done me the exciting kindness, in 
his edition of Kelsen's International Law, of making a rather systematic 
analysis and criticism of my positions from the point of view of "progres-
sive" policies. 27 He makes a number of policy criticisms of my position 
which I want to mention and (where I can) briefly answer. 
Robert Tucker's first criticism is that it is very dangerous to admit 
that there is any residual area of liberty to resort to force under interna-
tional law. Before 1914, he points out, the whole range of liberty of 
States to .use force was very vague, general and undefined. Living now 
under the United Nations, we ought to get rid of that vagueness. For 
instance (he points out) the United States quarantine was imposed on 
Cuba in respect of placement of missiles on Cuban territory, which on 
the face of it was perfectly legal for the Cuban government to do or 
permit on its own territory. He suggests (and he is probably right) that 
my positions would regard as lawful the United States' forceful reaction 
to the Cuban government's apparently lawful action, indicating the 
abuses arising from vagueness of the license. 
Now, I completely admit that prior to 1914 the liberty to go to war 
was very wide and vague. I would indeed say that it was a virtually 
unlimited liberty. Yet I also have to answer that we really do not get 
rid of the vagueness by putting our heads down and insisting obstinately 
on an idealist-restrictionist interpretation. It is probably true that all 
American international lawyers who joined in the debate about the law-
fulness of the Cuban quarantine, argued from within the idealist-
27. H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 67, 68, 85, 102, 428, 453 (2d ed. R. 
Tucker 1962). 
13
Stone: Force And The Charter
Published by SURFACE, 1974
14 Syr. J. Int'I L. & Com. [Vol. 2:1 
restrictionist view. The fact that they were "progressive" in this sense 
did not prevent vehement disagreement among them. Some said that 
the quarantine was lawful under Article 2( 4) because it was a response 
to a threat of force issued by Cuba and the Soviet Union, in the form of 
placement of missiles pointed at United States territory. Others, of 
course, and more vocally, rejected this. For them the missiles were per-
fectly lawfully placed on the Cuban territory, and the quarantine im-
posed by President Kennedy was a threat or use of force which violated 
Article 2( 4). 28 So my reply here is that even on idealist-restrictionist 
assumptions about the Charter, the problems of vagueness and its abuse 
in particular cases will remain. 
The second policy objection that Tucker makes is that on my view 
of the range of licit force, international law would not be law at all. After 
all, he urges, if there is any feature that must distinguish a legal order 
from other orders, it is that a legal order must draw a line between the 
legal use of force by Members and the use of force by Members that is 
unlawful. Any body of rules that does not do this is not law. These are 
admirable sentiments; but they are very unhistorical ones. So far is it 
from being the case that international law as law must necessarily draw 
a clear line between lawful and unlawful use of force, that before 1914 
there was not even an attempt to draw a line, let alone a line actually 
drawn. Despite all this, few authorities, except the Englishman John 
Austin, 29 questioned that international law existed as a body of norms 
which could be called "law." If Professor Tucker were right on this, then 
we would have to say that international law did not exist as law at all 
before 1914. 
Moreover, it simply is not true that the idealist-restrictionist view 
draws the line between lawful and unlawful war and my view does not. 
We are both drawing lines. Their line is there, and my line is here, for 
what they are both worth. 
The third policy objection made against my position is that I am 
performing a sleight of hand trick, at any rate, in my argument of policy 
that the Charter could not have imposed on members the obligation to 
submit without any limit to the grossest violations of their legal rights, 
as long as those violations did not include an armed attack by the 
culprit. Tucker charges me with saying that this should be rejected as 
an absurdly unacceptable result at this stage of world affairs, when the 
collective provisions for righting of wrongs mentioned in the Charter 
obviously are not working. 
This objection accuses me of a kind of conjuring trick. It points out 
28. See text accompanying note 6 supra. 
29. See J. AUSTIN, The PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (H.L.A. Hart. ed. 
1%4). 
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that the words of the Charter were fixed back in 1945, and that the scope 
of any license to use force by individual States must either have existed 
in and since 1945, or it cannot be admitted now. My argument (accord-
ing to Tucker) is that because collective measures for peaceful adjust-
ment of disputes under the United Nations have not worked, and be-
cause the Security Council and General Assembly have proved ineffec-
tive as means of settling disputes, we should now change the interpreta-
tion of the Charter as regards the scope of permissible violence by indi-
vidual States, so that the liberty of each State to use force for its own 
protection can compensate for the collective inadequacies. 
If my position were what this objection imputes to me, it would be 
a very powerful objection, but it is not. My position is very different. It 
is that at the time of drafting and adoption in 1945, it was clear from 
the travaux preparatoires, and from the whole range of diplomatic atti-
tudes, that there were grave uncertainties whether either the machinery 
for peace enforcement or the machinery for peaceful adjustment of dis-
putes under the new United Nations Charter would work. In view of this, 
and since we must credit negotiators for all States with matters of com-
mon knowledge, we must credit all concerned in 1945 with awareness of 
uncertainties of the future life of States under the Charter. Equivocation 
was to be expected, therefore, from the beginning. It is indeed, a fact of 
international life, as I wrote back in 1954, that the United Nations 
Charter is a two-faced instrument. One face looks backwards in time 
and leaves play for the old system of balance of power and alliances, self-
defense, and self-redress when wrongs are inflicted. Another face looks 
forward to a moral-idealistic vision of what an organization of States 
would be. Textual straddling goes back to 1945. It is not an ex post 
facto alteration by me or anyone else. All that I am saying is that in 
interpreting the Charter, we are entitled to take into account, where 
the text does raise different possibilities of interpretation, that as a 
matter of policy Members would be unlikely, either in 1945 or 1974, to 
leave themselves exposed and helpless in the face of an indefinite 
series of grave wrongs by a blanket prohibition of forceful reaction. We 
are entitled to remember that this is something which those draftsmen 
and ratifiers of the Charter had in mind, and which may explain much 
equivocation of language. 
Another reproach made to me in terms of "progressive" policy, is 
that I have been too hard on the idealist-restrictionist view, since Article 
2( 4) need not be interpreted to prohibit all use of coercion, but only the 
use of forceful or violent coercion. I have failed, says Robert Tucker, to 
recognize that even if all forceful coercion by States is made unlawful, 
States which have suffered wrongs may still have lawful means of pres-
sure and coercion, for instance economic sanctions against those who 
violate their rights. Aid and credit can be denied, trade limited or boy-
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cotted, and the like. Once I recognized the role of non-forceful coercion, 
thinks Robert Tucker, I would not be so worried about States being left 
helplessly exposed to an indefinite series of wrongs. For what it is worth, 
I grant this point. But the relief from wrong it gives is not great. It is 
often dubious these days whether creditors have more power over debt-
ors than vice versa. Great Powers often compete with each other to give 
aid. When the United States withdrew the support for the Aswan Dam 
:Project, it merely made room for massive Soviet economic entry to the 
Middle East. Since this led also to massive Soviet military involvement, 
it is even questionable that economic sanctions would represent "prog-
ress" in the sense of his criticism. 
Time prevents me from considering two or three other criticisms of 
this sort, and I move to the important final one. In this Professor Tucker 
is asking me to reconsider the position, even supposing I am right, and 
that the Charter does not mean what the idealist-restrictionists say it 
means about the outlawing of force, is it not still my duty, as one 
devoted to the ideals of international peace, and the progress of the 
international community, to put my weight behind the movement to 
banish the hateful practice of war from the world? In other words, ought 
I not to desist from expressing my skepticism about the actual scope of 
the Charter's prohibitions, keep quiet and stop rocking the "progres-
sive" boat? In putting this final point one has to be careful to say, as 
the criticism does, that this duty arises in the circumstances in which 
the campaign for the banning of war from human affairs has to be 
waged. And this very caveat is the point of my reply, and leads probably 
to the most important single thing that I want to say tonight. 
I think the circumstances of our period not only now, but in the 
whole generation that has passed since 1945, have been such that to 
pretend that the prohibition on the use of force under the Charter is as 
wide as the moralist-idealist-restrictionists say it is, and therefore to 
invite cross-accusations of aggression, whenever force has to be arrested, 
probably hinders rather than promotes peace and progress in the inter-
national community. Remember that we are in an age where there is no 
organ, not even the Security Council, usually able or willing to make a 
determination of this matter. (The Great Power veto makes sure of this.) 
We are in an age when nationalism is not retreating, as the founding 
fathers of the Charter perhaps thought, but when we face an enormously 
intense and widespread insurgence of nationalism, and unprecedented 
manipulation of this insurgence by outside powers, whether in Africa or 
Asia, the Middle East or the Mediterranean. 
In these and other circumstances of our age, I tend to think that 
for us to pretend that the prohibitions of the use of force by the Charter 
are clearer, stricter, and more definite than they are, really does not help 
towards the banishment of force from the relations of States. What this 
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pretense does, for the most part, is to put additional weapons of political 
warfare and harassment into the hands of each disputant State. Instead 
of their arguing about the merits, rights and wrongs of some economic 
or territorial or demographic or strategic difference between them, they 
argue about which of them is the naughty aggressor, which is the viola-
tor of the Charter, without any real chance, as a practical matter, of 
bringing this question to a clear determination. 
The self-gratification of being able to sleep peacefully at night is 
important. It may well give me, and you, greater peace of mind to join 
wholeheartedly in a movement for world government. It will probably 
help us to sleep better at night. Yet let us be under no illusion, until we 
have examined the matter with our minds as well as our hearts, that it 
can bring world government any nearer. 
Some years ago, I told an American audience my favorite story of 
the young lady of Melbourne. Perhaps it is time to tell it again. Mel-
bourne, as you know, is the main rival city to Sydney, and rather more 
staid and prudish than Sydney (for Sydney has certain American tend-
encies). Now this young lady came of a rather proud, patrician Mel-
bourne family, and she lived in a sfately home on the banks of the Yarra 
River, at one of the rare points where the Yarra is· still beautiful. She 
was sleeping peacefully, as any young lady of good breeding should be 
at 3 in the morning, in her bedroom, which gave out onto a beautiful 
lawn. Then, suddenly, the French windows from the lawn were thrown 
open, and a stranger with fiery eyes strode to her bedside, and with one 
sweeping gesture, he threw aside her bedclothes, lifted her like a feather 
in his arms, and strode out again through the French windows and onto 
the lawn. Of course, this poor young lady was absolutely terrified and 
utterly unable to make any sound. So she settled, as best she could, into 
the situation, and nestled down in his arms, right till he got to the green 
sward on the bank of the Yarra River, where the grass sloped gently 
down to the water. There he bent and laid her down on the grass. And 
just at this moment she recovered her breath, enough to speak and say: 
"W-What are you going to do now?" And he looked down at her with 
his fiery eyes and he said: "Well, lady, it's your dream!" 
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